#400 -Rule Blame

With all this hoo-ha blaming rules for unsafety, oh, there are to many rules safety experts say, none of these 'antiruleists' have even thought to consider the rules may not be the 'real' issue. But let me again shift their nonthinking to somethinking. Maybe! all the rules that have been added to a task over time are all 'fit for safety' (new term). Maybe if we followed all the rules, then the rules that were invented to control the risks would in fact control the risks as planned! So why so many in safety against safety, against rules? I can only come down to the fact that they seem to support profit over safety. Think about it. It's a core reason why it's an easy sell to business to take away rules, WHY? as each rule costs time and money! They all seem to hate rules and call them overcomplicating work. But none of them say...”we hate how no practicable time is given to allow workers to follow the rules” Workers are given new rules all the time (and that’s a good thing), each rule has time/cost factor, yet the workers are expected to do the work in same time frame prior to the new rule...do you see the issue?

#399 - Blame rules, it's easier

I always find it most entertaining when safety experts with one agenda (to prove rules and law cause incidents) never seem to look for evidence that more incidents are caused by deviations to the rule, than by following the rules.
They find one case where a rule caused an event (yet to be proven BTW), then claim rules are bad. Yet they never look at working to rule for example They never look at why workers cannot work to rule. They never look at the cost it takes to work to rule. All they do is look at surface rust and then try and clean it with salt water and steel brush!.. In my view, if workers were more fully trained and competent and had time to apply the rules, then as I have said many times...many incidents would not occur (outside random events), maybe even by 90%. When we start to look at this point, we can see that the rules are NOT the problem as portrayed..it's the pressures that stop us from practicing the rules. And I don't see any new view safety person talking about the Cost Of Safety as it cannot be solved. The true wicked problem is YOU dont want to pay for safety! True cost of practicable HERE

#398 - Paradox with no cure

We have all read it by so called leading lawyers and academics with bias self agendas. The topic of THE SAFETY PARADOX (the many of them) 1) more is better, but not 2) risk controls create more risk taking (RHT) 3) zero harm makes for more harm 4) over managing causes more risk 5) too much control causes more risk etc, etc... all supposedly creating a ‘false sense of safety’. BUT after reading all these expert articles, not one has given any tool/assessment to test/check if they are creating a PARADOX. Strange hey, yet they all sound so clever in hindsight using examples where people should have predicted the PARADOX! I love how these experts love to make a point...but offer nothing to improve the problem they raise (so just trivial jargon).. is it that they don't want to create a PARADOX!!!..now there is the question. Maybe the biggest PARADOX today is; People are the solution...not sure, as from what I can tell, ALL OHS seems to have to control them from making and taking risk!. Maybe we should ask these experts to maybe foresee the PARADOX they have yet to create, so I can write in advance the PARADOX they created!!!..now there is a proactive action! SC - I am the paradox.

#396 - Prince not wearing seatbelt

Britain's Prince Philip has been spoken to by the police for driving without a seatbelt - just two days after the 97-year-old survived a car crash. NOW...your Majesty...I was pulled over the other week for not having my motorcycle helmet strap done up...$300 fine I got!! WHY did not the officer just give me a 'spoken to'??? WHY THE TWO RULES??? I want what is fair...I seek a 'Just Culture'...the LAW says you must wear a seatbelt...period! How can I TRUST police for being subjective in their ruling? But I suppose, maybe some OHS lawyer said - it was 'reasonability practicable' to not wear one for just going down the shops for a pie...don't tell the wife! Some psychologist said - Take a risk Maybe we need to make a new RULE....POLICE cannot use discretion

#397 - Ron Gantt amazed

Ron Gantt never ceases to amaze me with his amazement of what 'consultation' has been asking us to do for years. Ron basically says that it isn't something that we intuitively think of to ask workers how things are working in their daily function/roles/tasks. (mmm again sounds like poor management) Ron basically says we don't have well designed tools and methods to even understand what's working. That seems to be goign against his logic of controlling people...now he seeks to control people with more systems...so now we will have a tool that is used wrong (what we have now), and one to use as a new view way.. UMMM..Really. Orthodox safety has no tools for this? 1) Tool Box talks 2) JHSA 3) SWMS 4) SOPs 5) Post task debriefs 6) Stop Cards 7) Start Cards 8) Investigations etc So Mr Gantt, seems you have the tools and these tools and methods have been around for a very long time...maybe you should learn how to use them before inventing some more paperwork and tools to overcomplicate the simple! Last thing we need is some new way outlining the old way!

#395 ) Milk Crate Problem

I need your help Safety Professionals with a problem. I have a small job to do at the office. I need to hang my 'Safety Cynic' certificate high on my office wall for all to see. I am a bit short, so need to stand on something to reach the height of high. Now, I have been told that if there is a high cost to control risk (costs to much to provide what is safe and known as what we ought to do), I can then use a lower method and still meet ALARP. So, to hang my certificate on my wall, I just need to put in a thumb tack (I have glove and safety glasses for that so all safe there) then hang the certificate frame up. A two minute job, and I have a milk crate handy to use right there (it has safety myth books etc in it). ~~~The Problem~~~ To hire a safety ladder is going to cost me $100 for the day, it’s going to take me 2 hours to go and get the ladder from the hire company (that’s 2 hours in downtime I’ll have to make up), fuel $20 etc... it’s all adding up, the ‘cost of safety’ that is. ~~~QUESTIONS~~~ Would you allow me (you sign off on the risk) to stand on a milk crate for a two minute job because it cost to much to provide what is needed to meet ALARP? And if fell, breaking my neck, do you think the court would let you off?

I am sure all those who have disagreed and failed to see what is ALARP are more confused now...All those of Safety Differently will be wondering is this' how work is done' is safe???

#394 - David Provan, GOAL ZERO DEATH

Just Read this Article by David Provan (doing a 'tour of duty' with SD/SII). David proposes; "that we replace our TRIFR targets with a 0 Fatality target" then says "Organizations will at least shift more of their focus to fatality prevention instead of recordable injury prevention". Then says "a zero recordable injury rate is not a practical target, but zero fatalities sure as hell should be" NOW... What David in all his wisdom seems to not understand is what is defined as a 'recordable injury'. And to that, the significance of it, and says he'd rather RI go up and fatalities go down. Is there not a connection David...a pyramid of sorts? I.e. Australia 2013. DEATHS; 186 RECORDABLE; 128,050 Does David not see that a focus on RECORDABLE will reduce Deaths, and that many RECORDABLE are near miss deaths (an inch away)! HOW can one even draw the line between zero recordable injury rate (not being a practical target as said by David) but then say zero fatalities sure as hell should be.HUHH...it makes no logical sense as both the same requirment. THERE IS one goal...ZERO HARM! and ZERO HARM (risk management) is to ensure workplaces are FREE from risks. A trivial post from David it is!

#393 - CONSULATION is new view?

All those in the UK that think Safety Differently and Sidney Dekker are inventing consultation IN 1974...till this day... (6)It shall be the duty of every employer to consult any such representatives with a view to the making and maintenance of arrangements which will enable him and his employees to co-operate effectively in promoting and developing measures to ensure the health and safety at work of the employees, and in checking the effectiveness of such measures. NOW...From what I can see...I see many have not even read the ACT nor even practiced it...yet here they all are jumping up and down about Safety Differently and saying this NEW VIEW will save safety...

#392 - FOR crying out ALARP.

OK...here we go again, the old mad bad dangerous to know Safety Cynic (that's me!!!) has to again try and somehow cure safety using good old 'above what a reasonable person ought to know' advice. So, this is what I know, for those under what I know! Again, I have 'subreasonable' safety people telling me that OHS LAW does not have a ZERO HARM goal (its not even mentioned they tell me!!!). I had one send me a link to their Safety Act (1974)...and I read it (not sure they have), and guess what...under general duties it makes it very clear that ZERO HARM is the goal. Its says (under general duties of employer - that is those who employ workers just in case you were unsure!!) these phrases: a) without risks to health b) absence of risks to health No I am no Einstein (I am way to clever for him)...but the words WITHOUT and ABSENCE are absolutes!!! Well, cook a cockatoo and slam it a bun with BBQ hot sauce!...all those in favor of the NEW VIEWS might as well throw the OHS LAW out...I mean...who of they, believe in Zero Harm as a good thing? not many I know on professional LinkedIn do! anyway...no one has been brave to answer my big question ..https://lnkd.in/gCsuuk6 SC - the year is so young, but the age so long!

#391 - Enhance what is by Ray

Ray Locke (safety expert) replied to a post about an upcoming Safety Differently/Safety-II workshop. I was asked in same post - "What, specifically, are your objections / issues with a Safety Differently / Safety II approach, Mark?" My reply - "Look at Ray Lockes reply below..it has the issues I see...other than that...Even Jeffery Lyth (SD promoter) cannot even outline what is different about SD. WHAT really gets to me is how SD fans like to shape SD into now being an enhancement to traditional safety..but DO I REALLY need to list all the comments in the last 5 years about how BAD tradition/orthodox safety is!!! AND many still don't see what I see...how sad it is to see 'safety experts' assume SD is adding to what safety has always been about (not sure how Ray managed safety till now...but must have been bad apple). And let’s not forget - reduce incidents is driven by a ZERO HARM goal!

#390 - Science, it never gets there, so some think

Kinda makes me wonder how in some peoples vast worldview, there is no BLACK and WHITE and that all science practice only ever ends with an approximation (give or take and there abouts). What also a strange view to have that science people...let’s call them scientists...must have to accept that whatever they are chasing...let’s say for example..that one does not get harmed in space by radiation...that this goal is one they can never reach! I understand why some dislike Zero Harm...such a bad goal! I also understand that all Carsten's views have no direct absolute end...its all just grey and some is good and some is bad...imagine him leading safety! mmm...I think I'd like to be a scientist, I could spend all my time trying to prove absolutes exist... What a start to the year....life is comical that's for sure :)

#389 - What is RCA

Ron Gantt after all his years in safety, still does not know what an RCA is.

Ron Asks (to remain in the spotlight and to lead thou to the den of SD) -"It sometimes seems like there are so many versions of what people call “root cause analysis” that the term is simply a synonym for accident investigation" Ron Says " I definitively believe that root cause is a myth"

I really think Ron has never done or used an RCA method..he can't have, as for one he says it's a myth and two, if he had done one he know what one is! It is very simple safety experts. Root Cause of Space Shuttle Challenger was the O-ring Failure It took some time to get this Root Cause, but once known, we then can start tracing back all the contributing factors and causes that gave that failure. 

In this process we will find many factors. So, every factor that contributed played a part to why the O-ring failed..but the Root Cause of failure was the O-ring. It’s like Rons Movement...he and his SD clan have listed the Root Cause of safety flat-lining as (bureaucracy) they then went on to put down every 'Orthodox' safety practice we had in attempt to save people from hurting themselves (Zero Harm inspired)

#388 - Bimodal bipolar!

Cindi N. agrees 'safety' requires HSE practitioners to NOT focus on fixing broken things. This would of course be bimodal thinking...but how dare we have a cure for risk, that would make it a objective scientific absolute, driven by a goal of Zero Harm, which of course would mean it would be 'easy' to have in place mitigation controls set about by working within even the most basic of fundamental risk management...just makes me wonder that it seems the basics seem to have no basis for those who need John Green and Co. But dear safety expert in need of John Green and Co. could we dare not admit that the 'need' for reducing the 'performance drag' on the business by decreasing the volume of bureaucracy (you know that invented trivial stuff outside OHS LAW) is in fact by the very thing incompetent people invented in the first place who now have to fix it? It makes me wonder, is not John Green being bimodal in his thinking...and that his focus (in case you missed it) is trying to 'fix' the seemingly incompetence of leaders who must be so 'bad apple', they now need to take off the wall all those 'clean the microwave after use' rules! It's sad to again see that so many seem to think Consultation is a new thing

#387 - UM prevention is ZERO HARM logic

If I had a dollar for every so called safety expert and safety lawyer who has tried to tell me "There is no mention of risk scores, risk levels or Zero Harm in the Law" I'd be about 100 bucks richer. From expert lawyers to New View viewists to every other mythbuster and thought provoker I have heard this comment in general context... It's like these people have no idea about the Act and Regs etc. It is also like they cannot see how these topics are mentioned; these experts want to see ZERO HARM printed as cannot see it otherwise. Let me just make a few points for those naive! Who have books and manage safety for big business . The term 'Prevention' as used in the ACT and REGS is an absolute (ZERO HARM) The LAW does expect us to prevent accidents! Risk Management requires us to assess risk to ALARP...we measure it. I think many safety experts on LinkedIn should get out of safety...for they not know that fundamentals of it...hence cause more harm than good!

#386 - Binary opposition

Love this sort of BLACK and WHITE stuff from a leading safety lawyer, yet always find it funny how Greg posts this stuff, but yet often agrees a with those against using OHS requirements...I think Greg is confused and really is fighting an inner conflict between the right way and the stupid ways of some of his co-thinkers!! Lets look at a "How do you know if the safety risks in your business are being managed in accordance with your safety management system" OK, lets ask what is the SMS system based from...what does it have to meet? What criteria must be used to ensure it is meeting safety duty? Does any of the SMS accept incidents? And of course...is not all our efforts in safety driven by a desire to ensure ALL workers go home safe...shame Greg does not agree with the concepts and principles of ZERO HARM... And also...again and again, Greg also shows objectively that safety is what is required by LAW...so again, my term of safety stands soild; doing what we know we ought to be doing!!!HENCE safety is not subjective....

#385 - HOW to measure JUST CULTURE

Wanted to get my last post in for the year. I have been very busy inventing things to hopefully 'sell' to Safety Differently and have come up with lots of FREE (marketing) tools to use so they can measure their (propaganda) effectiveness. Yes I know, they cannot get away from measuring success by the absence of negative events (they keep using it), and yes they seem to have proved beyond any doubt how there seems to be so many in safety that have no idea about safety (all those who need to be told to care and listen and consult and investigate and risk assess and manage risk etc etc), but I thought...they need a way to measure JUST CULTURE. So, here it is. A simple to use, highly complex, interdependent, grey, subjective objective, maybe a bit linear, traffic light scale that will show exactly where you are and need to be. Now the goal ‘absolutely’ is reaching the binary green 'just' level. And having this level will ensure your organisation will win more contracts due to being excellent (.1% short of perfection BTW). NOW...be warned, some high in management roles may tend to overestimate where they are in each level, and workers may just not report untrust and uncaring events etc as fear they may be punished. Next up, flatline scale!

#383 - Take an accident, take a risk!

What am I doing over Christmas asked my manager? I said “reading safety books written by unsafeists to disenlighten me and frustrate me even more to a point they cause more harm than good, so I suppose it's self harm!!!. I have a real issue with safety experts telling the world that the LAW does not require us to prevent all accidents. Greg (and those who say this) are caught between the ‘here and now’ and ‘then and there’ (before and after) Let me ask; Tell me one foreseeable negative event that the LAW would permit us to take/have knowing the outcome? You see, the LAW does expect us to prevent all events in the ‘here and now’ (using risk management), but if an event happens, then it might be found (in hindsight) that the ‘then and there’ it was not possible. Can you see the point? The LAW is about the ‘here and now’ (prevention of harm), it tells us to 'do' things that are ‘reasonably able to be done in relation to ensuring health and safety’. It does not permit accidents to occur. They happen, but the law does NOT permit or make allowance for accidents to occur, period! SO, I will ask Greg ‘here and now’ to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that there is provisions in the OHS law that say we do not have to prevent all accidents Greg?..... SC - Embrace Accidents!


I have had it with the term ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). For me, it’s as simple as doing what we know we ought to be doing...how do we know? Acts, Regs, Codes, standards and guidelines (black and white). mmm, is not 'safety' doing what we know we ought to be doing? Having the term ALARP just opens up a subjective mess, yet the courts require what is ‘practicable’ to be determined objectively, by what one ought to reasonably to know. And it is by law that a PCBU know how to manage their risks...it is their obligation to know! So failing to know, would not meet what is practicable in the first case, as knowing is all there in black and white!!! So, I think there is no need for any other term outside ‘PRACTICABLE’ (able to be done or put into practice successfully)...it is either practicable or not...period! It also should have nothing to do with being acceptable or unaccpetable/tolerable or intolerable...again it is only if using a control is practicable - what ough to be done. Safety Cynic - I really do need to be AUSTRAILAS SAFETY MINISTER (vote 1 now - your safety is my practicable practicality)

#381 - I confess to my Sin

Looking at the 'new' slip sliding away subjective RESTORATIVE JUST CULTURE CHECKLIST (it's free so must be good...cough) that is founded on absolute black and white 'measurable' ends (YES/NO) with a how long is a bit of grey string (we are about here, mark your spot) line...it occurred to me how much the 'READY TO FORGIVE' section is actually very poorly worded....and words matter don't they! OK, you are a safety person with this checklist in hand and you ask the person who caused the event (human error BTW) to 'confess' to the harm caused and to up offer regret (to show you're human maybe)...so we can then scale it! This 'free' bit of safety extravaganza should be the safety joke of the year...and it just makes it to beat many other real stupid ideas and views (i will present these awards soon). So I award the 2018 award for the 'safety garbage award of the year' to Safety Differently (the cult out making safety a joke) for this checklist (more about marketing) form (yes another to add). So look forward to 2019...


#380 - Risk can be good Carsten

Have an interesting risky problem worth taking!. Carsten Busch, like many that seem to flood the safety world these days, seem to think Risk can be good and we need to take it. Sadly (like many flawed views of many), this view seems highly influenced by Dr Long who thinks that risk in a safety workplace context is like a child climbing a tree or a bet on a two up game (gambling) or rock climbing...yeah,, these risks are worth taking, one part of learning about harm, the other about possible financial gain and the other the rush! So I ask Carsten again…what is a risk we take in a safety only context? Rather simple question! I mean, there he is presenting/telling to the world how risk is good using a cup of coffee to explain his logic (well not his logic)…,yet uses no real workplace risk examples to make his point (same a Dr Long)….I think Carsten is a Risk to Safety (same as Dr Long).. Then Carsten goes to say we need to be ‘encouraging people to actively engage with risk’…umm, is that making safety a choice? As he does not think safety is a choice, yet thinks we should encourage them…why, don’t they know how to be safe (bad apples)…ahh is that why we need safety leadership and management (and all the new views)!!!

#379 - Just more BS by way of a SD checklist

Funniest thing I have seen today...the start (take note its number 1) of the Safety Differently Checklists Love the 'FORGIVENESS' part, sure makes a point how humans must need to be told how to act, LOL is he blaming humans? as why need to have this on the 'form'! Subjective slide scales, Dumb questions...But let’s look a major flaw in Sidney Dekkers views. (there will be many more to come on just this checklist alone) Anyway. He states a ‘Restorative Just Culture’ asks: • Who is hurt? • What do they need? • Whose obligation is that? These points/questions have nothing to do with exploring what needs to be done for future benefits, as these should be in place already under basic safety management processes. These questions are just covering the here and now (immediate response). If you need to ask these questions, then something is very wrong, again, management has failed. He talks of 'GOALS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE'...yet most of you put down Zero Harm as a goal, but more on that one in another post. The picture below is basically showing that Sidney must have a very flawed view of 'orthodox' safety if he thinks investigations are about blame etc. Sidney says we look at what should be done to repair the harm, HUH, what the freckle, basic investigations do this!

#378 - Cause isn't no cause

Just was in a 'discussion' where a safety expert tried to tell us that "Causes are constructs and meaningless" "Causes are not real, they don't exist" "You can't go and find a Cause" Mmm...A cause is a real thing as a cause is an action, a doing, and since this is true, then a cause exists and can be a meaningful thing to use and can even be measured. A cause is a person or thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition. Can you see the Cause in the photo? I wonder if HOP and other Human Factors (BBS) is about managing causes, that are real and exist? I think the cause of safety failing is incompetence.

#376 – What’s the fuss.

What is all this negative fuss over Human Error, why are some trying to frame it as bad? Why can't we just accept that Human Error as a term used in safety and it's here to stay and that we ensure it's used correctly. People like Erik Hollnagel are out to rid Human Error...WHY? what else are you going to replace it with? Erik says "The ‘old view’ of ‘human error’ was based on the convenient but false assumption that humans can be described and understood as machines" Mmm. So psychology being the scientific study of the human mind and its functions, especially those affecting behaviour in a given context, is this not looking at the human as a machine we are trying to learn, are not many or our controls in safety a given by the way humans typically act in situations? Erik says "The only reasonable alternative to ‘human error’, whether in the ‘old view’ or the ‘new view’, is a ‘no view’. The ‘no view’ simply says that ‘human error’ is not a meaningful category and that we therefore should stop using it" Mmm...there cannot be a 'no view'. Human Error is Human Error. There is machine error, or environment error, or tool error, system error etc...there is Human Error! SC - I think we have academic error

#377 - Is the a five leaf clover?

Its funny you know (well, it's all funny the way the world works, that being sadly funny how people make it work!)..I have said this a few times and those of the 'New Views Cults' did not like it, like when you throw a rock up in the air and it comes back down and hits you on the head because you had to look down to see where to run first and by the time you make your choice it to late! If workers are the solution outside rules and procedure and what they do in that instance worked this time, how can we know it will work the next time? do the SD people make it part of the system? Can we find another 'four leaf clover' tomorrow? A four leaf clover is considered good fortune and it said there is only one four-leaf clover for every 10,000 three-leaf clovers found...mmmm! Dam Pyramids! So my point - If Safety Differently are relying on things to go right outside planed work/rules, and that this 'right' was just an act of 'good fortune', can we say it will work tomorrow based on their own logic that work is never the same??? I'd like Erik Hollnagel or Dekker to reply?

#375 - Age of Engineering advancment

"We often find what we seek to find, then we often attribute what we find to what we seek to attribute, and I am master at this" MD I have made a trending graph to show one thing, that the downward trend of safety events prior to any slowing or flatlining was due to what I will frame the; Age of Engineering Advancement. Take Railways. Incident rates were once very high as workers did all hard work. They carried the sleepers, tracks, shovelled rocks and banged in spikes while working long days in outdoor conditions while living in tents. Over time, safety in design and engineering invented ways to rid the human worker from these hazards and risks. Each year, some new device or method that improved the safety was used to take out the human. The innovations were coming fast and the rates of harm dramatically dropped each year. The inventions did not target human performance. I think what we are seeing now is the limits of engineering, hence the flatline. What remains is the human aspect, and since humans make mistakes, this flat line is our expected mean rate of events. This means, not much more can be done to move this line down until the next machine takes the human error out of the equation. SC

#374 - Flatlined to Incline?

I never get 'amazed' at the spin these 'new-viewtarians" espouse. The contradictions, doublespeak and oxymorons are nothing short of 'a way' to convince...no, manipulate you into thinking that what they have is new or different. This whole sales marketing ploy using 'flatline' is rather entertaining for me (as is a measure of safety!) BUT; Look at the graph, pre-Safety Differently age, orthodox safety MUST have done a great job. Clearly the data backs this up. Maybe we have just reached a 'regression of the mean' level in that the events that happen now are unfixable (human) until better safety in design etc again takes the human out of the harms way (i.e. engineering has slowed, so the events rate flatline in respect). I think the 'war on error' (failure) is the only thing we can fight, the whole SD "understanding into why things go right and amplifying the capacity of the business to do this more often" is just a new way to say; we need to fix the unsafe things and business needs to ensure it provides what it ought to provide DAH!. But hang on, Green is saying "With less and less going wrong there is less and less to learn from" umm yes John...we learn from failures! and over time failures will slow or flatline.

#373 - War on Error

There are so many people in safety today that seem to think that orthodox safety (and please, I hate that term and how it divides, but have to use it make my points) is only about blame and being reactive (plus many more constructed negative views to show how a new view is so much better) Take one of Safety Differently top rung pyramid players…John Green John said in relation to orthodox safety; "Is it about more of the same, the hunt for more and ever less significant deviations, this constant war on error, waiting for something to break and fixing it" REALLY, is that his view!... All the work done in safety to date has only been based on waiting for bad things to happen and nothing of prevention! That safety prior to the age of NEW VIEW spins was all about sitting around waiting to do an investigation to find blame! These are the views expressed by the Safety Differently cult and people are so incompetently following it. SO...I'll keep offering up my question that no one can answer...can you? or do you dare to try? (be careful if you do try, I might just show how naive and incompetent you are) 1) WHAT is new or different about anything John Green is selling? SC- Safety has no voice, so I represent safety on its behalf

#372- Introducing; Perception of Easy

Been thinking about a common risk in the workplace. I have seen it, I have done it and I bet you have also. With my concept of; We don't go to work to hurt ourselves, yet we do put ourselves and others in harms way. I am working through what I have called; Chosen Harms Way Choice (CHWC), which will have a list of things we do that put us into harms way. Lets look a typical example; A worker needs to get something from height in the kitchen, the thing is about a foot out of reach, if only they were 6 foot high, not 5 foot!. Right there next to them is a milk crate (often used to sit on at lunch), but just down the hallway to the right in the store room behind the door to the left!...is an approved and rated hi-vis safety step ladder with rubber pads on each legs base and warning labels on it (do not stand on top rung, make sure ladder is on flat ground, make sure 3 points contact at all times) those types of safety signs. So what does the worker do, the same thing you'd do (I know you would) they use the crate as close. 20 Seconds later there is an emergency call to the ambulance to come pick a worker up with a broken neck as the crate sliped out from under them...WHY? Perception of Easy SC - take a risk!

What is Love - My version of Love my not be good for others

#371 - Introducing; Hypermovementisation

Lots of talk on how to much paperwork (bureaucracy) is causing unsafety in organisations. Not much talk other than mine, on how to many safety movements (new views) and other incomplete ideas is and will cause unsafety. We have all heard the spin; too much paper work, too many rules, too many OHS laws...that's what they say, those 'new way' marketeers and psychology know it all’s (lets conduct a psychology walk around and check for bias!). I see two trees of complexity, and one is growing much faster than the other. One is slowly adding more complexity and slowly leading the way into all manner of controls not yet even seen by all who are blinded by the hype while their heads are spinning looking for 'something' to save us from ourselves...bring in the systems for a zero failure goal!. While they think that what we have now is 'too much', they have not seen anything yet. I have said it many times before to closed minds who have short sighted vision - Safety Chases the Risks we create. Let be remembered, that is I, the Safety Cynic, who has tried to warn you of the yellow brick road you make, make sure its coated in antislip paint. SC - The next issue is the Pollination and Seed Drop

#370 - Risk Elimination via Substitution (HOC)

1) The Hazard is the Camel 2) The Risk is riding the camel to get from point A to B 3) The Risk Measure is 50% (you may or may not fall off:) We can eliminate the risk of riding the camel, by Substituting the camel with another form of transport. So, here is another example and proof that my theory on risk elimination HERE on every level of the Hierarchy of control (HOC) is validated. Too bad every safety person I have debated with still cannot even see that risk can be eliminated, and with that, Zero Harm possible! SC - Why is he not wearing a helmet...stupid fool!

#369 - AHARP

It's come to my attention that there are many people in the safety arena who seem to not follow the ALARP principle; that is to do all we can do, to ensure that the risk is reduced to a level that would deem the task 'safe to proceed' (given by OHS info/knowledge). i.e. wear gas mask Reviewing many workplace prosecutions, they all tend to say in broad terms; the person failed to provide/use the controls needed to prevent the incident. i.e. did not provide/use the gas mask So, what is clear to me is that there must exist an opposite to ALARP. So I have introduced the term AHARP. This means we have; ALARP - as low as reasonably practicable AHARP - as high as reasonably practicable When we consider my AHARP concept, we see that we try to get away with doing work closer to risk as possible without some/all of the controls. It would have us doing 'just enough' risk management under the threshold of risk activation to 'hopefully' get the job done. NOW, considering that some safety experts call those who want to work closer to ALARP; Spudheads, Wonks, Fun Police, Zealots, Crusaders etc, I can only assume that they rather move towards AHARP. Which makes sense, as they are also Antizeroists (those who move away from the goal of zero harm) SC


#368 - Somesensical

Introducing my new term 'Somesensical'. 'Somesensical' is the basic level (middle zone) of what one should ought to know about a topic and sits between commonsensical and nonsensical; i.e. While it may not be commonsensical to know risk (as per photo), most have Somesensical notion of what is risk. So...Just heard Casten Busch (safety expert) talk about this photo. He askes us to not call the workers stupid (nonsensical), but to ask why they choose to take/allow this risk..mmm (safety is a choice!). But says risk is not all bad, but I can easy make my case that EVERY risk in a safety context is bad - hence why we try and mitigate risk to ALARP (we don't AHARP like some extreme sports person- I like that and will use that in another post). Ok, so we ask the worker and he says; "He is not going to take the scaffold down and put it back up for a one hour fix up job" (the example used by Carsten) Is that accepetable? or, is it just a typical example of workers taking risk? If we ask; why does it make sense to them, what really do you think the answer is going to be!...they just put themselves into harms way, when the safety stuff was there to use (even the ladder behind him) Mind the blame on the system SC


#367 - Concerning Need.

As with my views on why I think safety is failing, it's pretty self-evident why 'Safety Differently', Safety II and 'New Views' are growing in 'need'. Because a larger portion of leaders/managers/officers lack the basic understanding of Risk Management. I can only refer to the 80/20 rule to show my theory. As noted a few times now, it's clear to me that the people needing to participate in these so called 'movements' seemed to have failed so badly at getting the basics right, or worse, do not even know of the basic’s existence, they are out looking for the silver bullets to compensate for their own incompetence that caused the failure. The Safety Differently experiments (Woolworths and Health) have proved to me one thing that I dare most, if any have observed. And it is very important people get/see it! In both cases, external influences must not have caused the failures Dekker points out. This means that the failures were self-created and internally driven. This by logic we can only put accountability onto the top end (leaders). They lacked any capacity to listen, train, adjust, simplify, care, respect and value (etc), and it's cost a lot in harm and profit. These movements are attracting the worst safety leaders!